Supreme Court Midterm Review for States and Local Governments 2017

March 2017

By: Lisa Soronen, State and Local Legal Center, Washington, D.C.

The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) files Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Big Seven national organizations representing state and local governments.

*Indicates a case where the SLLC has filed or will file an amicus brief.

First Amendment

In *Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley* the Supreme Court will decide whether Missouri can refuse to allow a religious preschool to receive a state grant to resurface its playground based on Missouri’s “super-Establishment Clause.” The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers grants to “qualifying organizations” to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. The DNR refused to give a grant to Trinity Church’s preschool because Missouri’s constitution prohibits providing state aid directly or indirectly to churches. Trinity Church argues that excluding it from an “otherwise neutral and secular aid program” violates the federal constitution’s Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, which Missouri’s “super-Establishment Clause” may not trump. In *Locke v. Davey* (2004) the Supreme Court upheld Washington State’s “super-Establishment Clause,” which prohibits post-secondary students from using public scholarships to receive a degree in theology. The lower court concluded *Locke* applies in this case where: “Trinity Church seeks to compel the direct grant of public funds to churches, another of the ‘hallmarks of an established religion.’”

The issue in *Packingham v. North Carolina* is whether a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing commercial social networking websites where the registered sex offender knows minors can create or maintain a profile, violates the First Amendment. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that North Carolina’s law is constitutional “in all respects.” The court first concluded that North Carolina’s law regulates “conduct” and not
“speech,” “specifically the ability of registered sex offenders to access certain carefully-defined Web sites.” The court then concluded that the statute is a “content-neutral” regulation because it “imposed a ban on accessing certain defined commercial social networking Web sites without regard to any content or message conveyed on those sites.” Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded the statute was narrowly tailored to prohibit registered sex offenders from accessing websites where they could gather information about minors. Registered sex offenders could still use websites “exclusively devoted to speech” including instant messaging services and chat rooms, websites requiring no more than an a user name and email address to access content, and websites where users must be at least 18 to maintain a profile.

The question the Supreme Court will decide in *Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman* is whether state “no-surcharge” laws that prohibit vendors from charging more to credit-card customers but allows them to charge less to cash customers violate the First Amendment. Expressions Hair Design would like to charge three percent more to credit card customers for its goods and services but is prohibited from doing so by New York’s “no-surcharge” law, Section 518. Expressions argues that Section 518 regulates speech in violation of the First Amendment. Merchants are allowed to characterize a price difference as a “cash discount” but not as a “credit-card surcharge.” The Second Circuit disagreed concluding that the terms “cash discount” and “credit-card surcharge” are not mere labels. Section 518 regulates conduct and not speech—it prohibits a vendor from charging credit-card customers more than the sticker price.

The issue in *Lee v. Tam* is whether Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which bars the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) from registering scandalous, immoral, or disparaging marks, violates the First Amendment. The PTO refused to register the band name The Slants finding it likely disparaging to persons of Asian descent. The Federal Circuit ruled Section 2(a) is unconstitutional. Among other arguments, the court rejected the PTO’s argument that trademark registration and the “accoutrements of registration” amount to government speech. The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans* (2015), where the Court concluded that specialty license plates were government speech, even though a state law allowed individuals, organizations, and nonprofit groups to request certain designs. “There is simply no meaningful basis for finding that consumers associate registered private trademarks with the government.” Relatedly, the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO’s argument that trademark registration is a form of government subsidy that the government may refuse to extend where it disapproves of a mark’s message. “[T]rademark registration is not a program through which the government is seeking to get its message out through recipients of funding (direct or indirect).”
Police/Qualified Immunity

It is undisputed that police officers used reasonable force when they shot Angel Mendez. As officers entered, unannounced, the shack where Mendez was living they saw a silhouette of Mendez pointing what looked like a rifle at them. Yet, the Ninth Circuit awarded him and his wife damages because the officers didn’t have a warrant to search the shack thereby “provoking” Mendez. In *Los Angeles County v. Mendez* the Supreme Court must decide whether to accept or reject the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation” rule. Per this rule, “Where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.” The Mendezes also argue that putting the provocation theory aside, the officers are liable in this case because their unconstitutional entry “proximately caused” them to shoot Mendez. Many Americans own guns. So, it is reasonably foreseeable that if officers barge into a shack unannounced the person in the shack may be holding a gun.

In *Manuel v. City of Joliet* the Supreme Court held 6-2 that even after “legal process” (appearing before a judge) has occurred a person may bring a Fourth Amendment claim challenging pretrial detention. Elijah Manuel was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance even though a field test and a lab test indicated his pills weren’t illegal drugs. A county court judge further detained Manuel based on a complaint inaccurately reporting the results of the field and lab tests. Forty-eight days later Manuel was released when another laboratory test cleared him. Manuel brought an unlawful detention case under the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit held that such a case had to be brought under the Due Process Clause which Manuel failed to do. Justice Kagan explains why pretrial detention after legal process can be challenged under the Fourth Amendment: “The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Then, too, a person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification. Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim—or somehow, as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause.”

United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., shot and killed Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, who was standing on the Mexico side of the U.S./Mexico border. At the time of the shooting Agent Mesa didn’t know that Hernandez was a Mexican citizen. One question in *Mesa v. Hernandez* is whether qualified immunity may be granted or denied based on facts — such as the victim’s legal status — unknown to the officer at the time of the incident. The Fifth Circuit granted Agent Mesa qualified immunity based on the
fact that Hernandez was a Mexican citizen even though Agent Mesa didn’t know that at the time of the shooting. A second question this case is whether Hernandez has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force even though he was a Mexican citizen shot on Mexican soil. The Fifth Circuit relied on a 1990 Supreme Court case United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez to reach the conclusion Hernandez has no such right. Hernandez argues the Supreme Court should rely on the more recent Boumediene v. Bush (2008). In this case the Supreme Court “held that ‘de jure sovereignty’ is not and has never been ‘the only relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution’ because ‘questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.’”

In Ziglar v. Turkmen, Ashcroft v. Turkmen, and Hasty v. Turkmen, a number of “out-of-status” aliens were arrested and detained on immigration charges shortly after 9/11. They claim they were treated in a “discriminatory and punitive” manner while confined and detained long after it was clear they were never involved in terrorist activities. They have sued former Attorney General John Ashcroft, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Robert Mueller, former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, James Ziglar, and two wardens and an assistant warden at the federal detention center where they were held. The detainees brought three claims: (1) substantive due process (confinement conditions failed to meet due process); (2) equal protection (detainees were confined to these conditions because of their race, religion, etc.); and (3) conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (government officials conspired together to violate equal protection rights of the detainees). The Second Circuit denied qualified immunity to all of the government officials on all three of these claims. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Second Circuit decisions. All of the government officials make the same argument regarding § 1985(3). Previously, the Second Circuit had not ruled whether § 1985(3) applied to federal officials. So they argue, how could they have violated “clearly established” law? Regarding the first and second claim, Zigler criticizes the Second Circuit for not considering the 9/11 context in the decision to detain the Respondents. Similarly, Ashcroft and Mueller criticize the Second Circuit for viewing Respondents as “ordinary civil detainees” or “pretrial detainee[s]” instead of as persons “legally arrested and detained in conjunction with the September 11 investigation.” Finally, the wardens and associate warden claim that no clearly established law gave them authority to “unilaterally overrule the FBI’s terrorism designations and place respondents in less restrictive condition.”

In White v. Pauly police officers went to Daniel Pauly’s house to get his side of the story that he was drunk driving. Daniel and his brother Samuel claim the officers stated they were coming in the house but failed to identify themselves as police officers. Officer Ray White arrived after the officers (inadequately) announced themselves. He hide behind a stone wall after hearing one of the brothers say “we have guns.” Daniel fired shots and Samuel pointed a gun at another officer. Officer White shot and killed Samuel. The Pauly brothers claim that Officer White used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and should be denied qualified immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that Officer White violated no clearly established law in this case.
“Clearly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from assuming that proper procedures, such as officer identification, have already been followed. No settled Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the one White confronted here.”

**Preemption**

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) governs federal employee health insurance benefits and authorizes the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to enter into contracts with private health insurance companies to administer benefit plans. FEHBA preempts state law relating to the “nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.” Coventry Heath Care argued that FEHBA preempts Missouri’s anti-subrogation law. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed reasoning that Missouri’s anti-subrogation law does not clearly “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.” In 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision after OMP promulgated a rule saying that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities pertaining to subrogation “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.” The Missouri Supreme Court again ruled that FEBHA doesn’t preempt Missouri’s anti-subrogation law. The Missouri Supreme Court refused give to *Chevron* deference to OPM’s rule reasoning “no binding precedent requiring courts to afford dispositive deference to an agency rule defining the scope of an express preemption clause.” In *Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils* the U.S. Supreme Court again agreed to decide whether FEBHA preempts Missouri’s anti-subrogation law. Implicit in that question is whether *Chevron* deference applies to an agency’s regulation construing the scope of a statute’s express-preemption provision. In a one-paragraph concurring opinion a majority of the Missouri Supreme Court also concluded the section of FEHBA in question is unconstitutional per the Supremacy Clause because it attempts “to give preemptive effect to the provisions of a contract between the federal government and a private party,” here a health insurance company. The U.S. Supreme Court will also review this question.

The question in *Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark* is whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Kentucky’s rule that an “attorney-in-fact” may bind a principal to an arbitration agreement only if the power-of-attorney document expressly refers to arbitration agreements. A number of parents executed power-of-attorney documents designating one of their children “attorney-in-fact.” While some of these documents gave the children broad rights to act on their parent’s behalf (“to do and perform for me in my name all that I might if present”), none explicitly gave their children the authority to agree to arbitration (rather than a jury trial) to resolve disputes regarding their parent’s legal rights. All the children signed an arbitration agreement when their parents were admitted to nursing homes. After the parents died in the nursing homes, the children wanted to sue the nursing homes—and avoid arbitration—for various claims. Per the Federal Arbitration Act all valid arbitration agreements must be enforced. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration agreements in this case were
invalidly formed. The children did not have the authority to agree to arbitration where the power-of-attorney documents did not express state they had that authority.

**Education**

The Supreme Court held unanimously in *Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District* that public school districts must offer students with disabilities an individual education plan (IEP) “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Per the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a student with a disability receives an IEP, developed with parents and educators, which is intended to provide that student with a “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE). *Board of Education v. Rowley* (1982) was the first case where the Supreme Court defined FAPE. In that case the Court failed to articulate an “overarching standard” to evaluate the adequacy of an IEP because Amy Rowley was doing well in school. But the Court did say in *Rowley* that an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to receive educational benefits.” For a child receiving instruction in the regular classroom an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child” to advance from grade to grade. In *Endrew F.* the Court stated that if “progressing smoothly through the regular curriculum” isn’t “a reasonable prospect for a child, his IEP need not aim for grade level advancement. But his educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”

In *Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools* the Supreme Court held unanimously that if a student’s complaint against a school seeks relief for a denial of a free appropriate public education it must first be brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), instead of under other statutes that might also be violated. Napoleon Community Schools prohibited a kindergartener with cerebral palsy from bringing a service dog to school. The district noted the student had a one-on-one human aid who was able to provide the same assistance as the dog. IDEA requires school districts to develop individualized education programs for students with disabilities, which are intended to provide them with a “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 5 for the Rehabilitation Act prohibit all public entities from discriminating on the basis of disability. The Frys’ brought a lawsuit for money damages for emotional distress under the ADA and Section 5. The school district argued the lawsuit first should have been brought under IDEA, which requires parents to go through an administrative process before going to court and does not allow for money damages for emotional distress. IDEA states that if a lawsuit “seek[s] relief that is also available under the IDEA” it first must be brought under IDEA even if the lawsuit also alleges violations of other statutes. According to the Court the relief that IDEA makes available is for denial of a
FAPE. So to have to bring a lawsuit under IDEA the crux of the lawsuit must be that FAPE was denied.

**Civil Procedure**

Steven Sherman sued the Town of Chester alleging an unconstitutional taking as the town refused to approve a subdivision on plots of land Sherman intended to sell to Laroe Estates. Laroe Estates advanced Sherman money for the land in exchange for a mortgage on the property. Sherman defaulted on a loan to a senior mortgage holder who foreclosed on the property. Laroe Estates, claiming to be the owner of the property, sought to “intervene” in the takings lawsuit. The district court concluded that Laroe Estates lacked Article III “standing” under the U.S. Constitution to assert a takings claim against the Town. The question the Supreme Court will decide in *Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates* is whether Laroe Estates may intervene in this case even though it lacks standing. The Second Circuit held, based on prior circuit court precedent, Laroe Estates does not have to have standing to intervene in this lawsuit where there is a genuine case or controversy between the existing parties.

**Redistricting**

When North Carolina redistricted in 2010 it added two majority black voting age population (BVAP) districts. The two state legislators chairing the joint redistricting committee claimed that per *Bartlett v. Strickland* (2009) “districts created to comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, must be created with [BVAP] . . . at the level of at least 50% plus one.” Section 2 of VRA prohibits minority vote dilution in redistricting. While previously neither district was majority BVAP, African-American preferred candidates “easily and repeatedly” won reelection in the last two decades. Plaintiffs in *McCrory v. Harris* claim that creating these two majority BVAP districts was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. An unconstitutional racial gerrymander occurs when race is the predominant consideration in redistricting and the use of race serves no narrowly tailored, compelling state interest. Two of the three judges on the panel had little trouble concluding that race was a predominant factor in drawing both of the districts. The North Carolina legislature argued it had a compelling interest in relying predominately on race in redistricting to avoid vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA. But the court found no “strong basis in evidence” of a risk of vote dilution requiring a majority BVAP. Previously, the white majority hadn’t voted as a bloc to defeat African-Americans’ candidates of choice.

**Capital Punishment**

In *Moore v. Texas* the Supreme Court will review a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision to apply a previous definition of “intellectually disabled” adopted in a 1992 death penalty case rather than the current definition. In *Atkins v. Virginia* (1992) the Supreme Court held that executing the intellectually disabled violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The Court tasked states with implementing Atkins. In 1980, Bobby Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a seventy-year-old grocery clerk during a robbery. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on a 2004 case that adopted the definition of intellectual disability stated in the ninth edition of the American Association on Mental Retardation manual published in 1992, concluded that Moore wasn’t intellectually disabled. According to the court it was up to the Texas Legislature to implement Atkins. Until it did so, the court would continue to apply this 1992 definition.

In Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) the Supreme Court held that if a criminal defendant’s mental health will be a significant factor at trial the state must ensure that the defendant has access to a “competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” The question the Supreme Court will decide in McWilliams v. Dunn is whether such an expert must be independent of the prosecution. A state “Lunacy Commission” concluded James McWilliams “was competent to stand trial, free of mental illness at the time of the crime, and faking psychotic symptoms.” McWilliams was sentenced to death for robbing, raping, and shooting a convenience store employee. At the penalty phase McWilliams’ mother testified he had head injuries as a child, which his defense counsel did not know about. Before sentencing, the trial court appointed a state neuropsychologist to evaluate McWilliams. The neuropsychologist had no confidential relationship with McWilliams; he delivered his report to both the defense and the prosecution. McWilliams argues that Ake entitles him to an evaluation by a mental health professional who he has a confidential relationship with. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed without any explanation other than noting the federal circuit courts of appeals are split on this question.

In a three-page per curiam (unauthored) opinion in Bosse v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to allow victims’ relatives to recommend to the jury that they sentence a defendant to death. In Booth v. Maryland (1987) the Supreme Court held that during sentencing capital juries could only hear victim impact evidence that relates directly to the circumstances of the crime. Four years later in Payne v. Tennessee the Court changed course holding that capital juries could hear evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family. In Payne the Court stated that it didn’t reconsider its holding in Booth that admission of a victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. Regardless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Payne “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regarding characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.” The Supreme Court reminded the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that the Supreme Court alone overrules its precedent.

**Miscellaneous**

The issue in Wells Fargo v. City of Miami* and Bank of America v. City of Miami* is whether Miami has statutory standing to sue banks under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for economic harm
caused to the City by discriminatory lending practices. The FHA allows “aggrieved person[s]” to sue. The banks argue that in Thompson v. North American Stainless (2011), the Supreme Court defined “aggrieved person,” under another federal statute, to require that a plaintiff fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute and have injuries proximately caused by the statutory violation. Unsurprisingly, the banks argue that the City doesn’t fall within the zone of interests protected by the FHA and that the banks’ conduct didn’t cause economic injury to the City. The Eleventh Circuit concluded Miami had statutory standing relying on a much older case, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (1972), where the Supreme Court stated that statutory standing under the Fair Housing Act is “as broad[] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” The parties do not dispute that the City of Miami has Article III standing in this case. So if the Court agrees that only Article III standing is required to also have statutory standing Miami has statutory standing to sue the banks.

In Murr v. Wisconsin* the Supreme Court will decide whether merger provisions in state law and local ordinances, where nonconforming, adjacent lots under common ownership are combined for zoning purposes, may result in the unconstitutional taking of property. The Murrs owned contiguous lots E and F which together are .98 acres. Lot F contained a cabin and lot E was undeveloped. A St. Croix County merger ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership that are less than one acre total. But the ordinance treats commonly owned adjacent lots of less than an acre as a single, buildable lot. The Murrs sought and were denied a variance to separately use or sell lots E and F. They claim the ordinance resulted in an unconstitutional uncompensated taking. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled there was no taking in this case. It looked at the value of lots E and F in combination and determined that the Murrs’ property retained significant value despite being merged. A year-round residence could be located on lot E or F or could straddle both lots. And state court precedent indicated that the lots should be considered in combination for purposes of takings analysis.

The Supreme Court will decide in Nelson v. Colorado whether it violates due process to require criminal defendants whose convictions have been reversed to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence to receive refunds of monetary penalties they have paid. Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexually assaulting her children. She was ordered to pay a variety of costs and fees. The appeals court overturned her conviction and a new jury acquitted her. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that due process does not require that a court award Nelson the costs and fees she paid. The Colorado Exoneration Act authorizes a court to issue refunds to exonerated defendants. Nelson didn’t pursue a claim under the Exoneration Act. According to the Colorado Supreme Court: “The Exoneration Act provides sufficient process for defendants to seek refunds of costs, fees, and restitution that they paid in connection with their conviction.” To receive compensation under the Act, the exonerated person must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she was “actually innocent.”
Most states, including Colorado, and the federal government have a “no-impeachment” rule which prevents jurors from testifying after a verdict about what happened during deliberations. After a jury convicted Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez of three misdemeanors related to making sexual advances toward two teenage girls, two jurors alleged that another juror made numerous racially biased statements during jury deliberations. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, Pena-Rodriguez argues that if Colorado’s “no-impeachment” rule bars admission of the juror’s racially biased statements it violates his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an “impartial” jury. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed. In two previous cases the Supreme Court ruled that the federal “no-impeachment” rule wasn’t unconstitutional where it barred admission of evidence that the jury was “one big party” where numerous jurors used drugs and alcohol (Tanner v. United States, 1987) and that a juror in a car-crash case said in deliberations that her daughter caused a car accident and had she been sued it would have ruined her life (Warger v. Shauers, 2014). These two cases stand for a “simple but crucial principle: Protecting the secrecy of the jury deliberations is of paramount importance in our justice system.”

When the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigates allegations of employment discrimination if the employer refuses to provide the information the EEOC requests the EEOC will issue a subpoena demanding the employer produce the information. If the employer refuses to comply with the subpoena the EEOC may ask a court to enforce it. The question in McLane v. EEOC is whether a court of appeals should review a district court’s decision to quash or enforce an EEOC subpoena de novo (“from the new”), instead of deferring to the lower court’s ruling. Of the nine federal circuits to consider this question, only the Ninth Circuit reviews EEOC subpoena requests de novo. In its opinion, even the Ninth Circuit admits it is “unclear” why it does so.

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows third parties to sue on behalf of the United States for fraud committed against the United States. Per the Act a FCA complaint is kept secret “under seal” until the United States can review it and decide whether it wants to participate in the case. In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby the Supreme Court held unanimously that if the seal requirement is violated the complaint doesn’t have to be dismissed. State Farm insurance adjusters alleged that after Hurricane Katrina, State Farm instructed them to falsely determine houses and property were damaged by flooding, instead of by wind. State Farm had to pay for wind claims and the federal government had to pay for flooding claims. While the claim was under seal the adjusters’ attorney disclosed the FCA complaint to national journalists. While the news outlets issued stories about the fraud allegations they didn’t reveal the existence of the FCA complaint. The Court concluded the FCA doesn’t require the “harsh” result of dismissal for a seal violation. When the FCA states that a complaint “shall” be kept under seal it specifies no remedy for a seal violation. But in other sections the statute explicitly requires dismissal for other actions of those bringing FCA claims.